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THE FIRST AMENDMENT, JOURNALISTS, AND
SOURCES: A CURIOUS STUDY IN “REVERSE
FEDERALISM”
Rodney A. Smolla*
I. A CURIOUS STORY OF REVERSE-FEDERALISM
The engaging presentations of Anthony Lewis, Max Frankel, and
Victor Kovner ranged widely and provocatively over questions of law
and journalistic ethics in relation to the journalist and his or her source.
Among the many perceptive insights that emerged in that colloquy
was the striking point that virtually all American states now recognize
some form of “reporter’s privilege,” protecting confidential sources,
either through legislatively enacted state “shield laws” or judicially
created privilege doctrines.
Justice Louis Brandeis, reflecting on the nature of our American
federalism, once referred to the states as laboratories for experiment.1
In that spirit, it might appear that the results of that experiment are now
in. American law seems to accept and embrace the wisdom of
providing some legal shield of confidentiality between reporter and
source, for the purpose of encouraging the free flow of information
between source and journalist, thereby facilitating the process of
newsgathering, all to the benefit of a better informed public and robust
marketplace of ideas.
But not so fast. In the federal judicial system, the relationship of
journalists to sources is currently under siege. It is unclear whether
journalists have any right grounded in federal constitutional or common
law to protect the identity of confidential sources.

* Dean and Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
1 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 386-87 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It
is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk
to the rest of the country.”).
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II. IS THE “REPORTER’S PRIVILEGE” A RULE OF FEDERAL LAW?
A.

The Ambiguity of Branzburg

There is judicial disagreement over whether a “reporter’s
privilege” exists in the federal system. The rub is over how to
understand Branzburg v. Hayes,2 the case in which the Supreme Court
appeared to reject, by a five-to-four vote, the existence of a privilege.
The opinion of the Court was brusque and unequivocal, making it plain
that no privilege exists, because journalists, like everyone else in
society, are bound by the rule of law.3
In a short three-paragraph concurring opinion, however, Justice
Powell wrote separately, in his words, to “add this brief statement to
emphasize what seems to me to be the limited nature of the Court’s
holding.”4 Justice Powell was famous for his role as the man in the
middle. It is a role I have always admired, and unabashedly praised. In
the specific context of the First Amendment and the media, Justice
Powell’s penchant for the center was central to two opinions that
continue to exert a strong gravitational pull on our law and policy, his
opinion in the libel case Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,5 and his concurring
opinion in Branzburg.
In Gertz, Justice Powell, writing for the Court, adopted a middleground with regard to the extension of the “actual malice” standard in
defamation cases, the highly protective standard that strongly protects
journalists (and other libel defendants) when it applies.6 Gertz adopted
2
3

408 U.S. 665 (1972).
The opinion of the Court in Branzburg was replete with language expressing stern rejection
of the privilege, with scores of sentences expressing, in different ways, the Court’s unwillingness
to read such a privilege into the First Amendment. See, e.g., id. at 697 (“Of course, the press has
the right to abide by its agreement not to publish all the information it has, but the right to
withhold news is not equivalent to a First Amendment exemption from the ordinary duty of all
other citizens to furnish relevant information to a grand jury performing an important public
function.”); id. at 698-99 (“We are admonished that refusal to provide a First Amendment
reporter’s privilege will undermine the freedom of the press to collect and disseminate news. But
this is not the lesson history teaches us. As noted previously, the common law recognized no
such privilege, and the constitutional argument was not even asserted until 1958. From the
beginning of our country the press has operated without constitutional protection for press
informants, and the press has flourished. The existing constitutional rules have not been a serious
obstacle to either the development or retention of confidential news sources by the press.”); id. at
699 (“It is said that currently press subpoenas have multiplied, that mutual distrust and tension
between press and officialdom have increased, that reporting styles have changed, and that there
is now more need for confidential sources, particularly where the press seeks news about minority
cultural and political groups or dissident organizations suspicious of the law and public officials.
These developments, even if true, are treacherous grounds for a far-reaching interpretation of the
First Amendment fastening a nationwide rule on courts, grand juries, and prosecuting officials
everywhere.”).
4 Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
5 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
6 “Actual malice” is a constitutional term of art in defamation law, requiring proof by clear
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a compromise: the actual malice standard would apply to cases in which
the plaintiffs were “public figures” or “public officials,” but a less
protective negligence standard would apply to private figures. And
indeed, Gertz had a “federalism” quality of its own, in that the Court
made it clear that the rules it was imposing were constitutional “floors,”
establishing the minimum fault requirements for defamation, but
simultaneously making it clear that states were free to be laboratories of
experiment, imposing high levels of fault if they chose. A handful of
states, including the very important jurisdiction of New York, a world
center of media and communication activity, took up the invitation, and
imposed higher standards.7
There is, however, a striking difference between Justice Powell’s
centrism in Gertz and his centrism in Branzburg. In Gertz, it was quite
clear what Justice Powell meant. In Branzburg, it was not. Gertz, in
fact, reads like a section from the Restatement of Torts. It is an
organized, coherent, multi-layered matrix of legal rules, establishing a
whole list of libel doctrines relating to the status of plaintiffs, fault, and
damages.8 While there have been many elaborations and refinements of
Gertz over the years, in its basic framework the case has been
remarkably stable. It remains the unshaken law of the land. Thousands
of lower court defamation cases have been litigated under its
framework. And while application of the Gertz doctrines is not always
easy—the question of whether a plaintiff is a public figure or private
and convincing evidence that a defendant published the defamatory material with “knowledge
that it was false” or “reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” See N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). The “reckless disregard” prong of the actual malice
standard means that the publisher “in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his
publication.” St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). To prove actual malice,
therefore, a plaintiff must “demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence that the defendant
realized that his statement was false or that he subjectively entertained serious doubts as to the
truth of his statement.” Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 511 n.30
(1984); McCoy v. Hearst Corp. 727 P.2d 711, 728 (Cal. 1986). Actual malice is a subjective
standard. The critical question is state of mind. Harte-Hanks Commc’ns v. Connaughton, 491
U.S. 657, 688 (1989). The Supreme Court and the lower courts have repeatedly emphasized the
subjective nature of the actual malice standard. Thus in Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979),
the Supreme Court considered whether the plaintiff could use discovery to probe the editorial
decision-making processes of CBS in connection with a 60 Minutes segment portraying a
Vietnam War hero’s allegations concerning atrocities which supposedly took place during the
war. The Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff could inquire into the defendant’s mental
processes, rejecting the defendant’s claim of special First Amendment privilege, emphasizing that
N.Y. Times and its progeny require the plaintiff to focus on the defendant’s subjective state of
mind. Id. at 170. And in Bose Corporation v. Consumer’s Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485
(1984), the Supreme Court, in reaffirming the principle of “independent appellate review” of the
actual malice determination, again emphasized the subjective nature of the inquiry, noting that the
actual malice issue before it “rests entirely on an evaluation of [the author’s] state of mind when
he wrote his initial report, or when he checked the article against that report.” Id. at 494.
7 See Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, 341 N.E.2d 569 (N.Y. 1975) (establishing a
“gross irresponsibility” standard for private figure libel cases involving issues of public concern).
8 See RODNEY SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 2:11 (2d ed. 2007).
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figure is quite often fiercely contested, with many cases very difficult to
call clearly—the essential fact remains that Gertz as legal doctrine has
proven hardy and enduring, and now seems well-absorbed into the
fabric of American First Amendment and media law.
In striking contrast, the opinion of Justice Powell in Branzburg has
proven a model of muddle. Justice Powell’s opinion, on the one hand,
seemed to profess agreement with the Chief Justice. Yet the opinion of
Justice Powell also proceeded, somewhat opaquely, to hint that it may
be appropriate to balance the competing interests at stake on a case-bycase basis.9
Very bright and very persuasive media advocates exploited the
ambiguity of the Powell opinion with incredibly facile facility.
Notwithstanding what seemed on the surface to be a resounding
pounding for the press in Branzburg, many lower courts, relying on
Justice Powell’s cryptic concurring opinion, held that the First
Amendment did provide a conditional reporter’s privilege of some
kind.10
9

Id.

Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring):
The Court does not hold that newsmen, subpoenaed to testify before a
grand jury, are without constitutional rights with respect to the gathering of
news or in safeguarding their sources. Certainly, we do not hold, as suggested
in Mr. Justice Stewart’s dissenting opinion, that state and federal authorities
are free to “annex” the news media as “an investigative arm of government.”. .
.
If a newsman believes that the grand jury investigation is not being
conducted in good faith he is not without remedy. Indeed, if the newsman is
called upon to give information bearing only a remote and tenuous relationship
to the subject of the investigation, or if he has some other reason to believe that
his testimony implicates confidential source relationship without a legitimate
need of law enforcement, he will have access to the court on a motion to quash
and an appropriate protective order may be entered. The asserted claim to
privilege should be judged on its facts by the striking of a proper balance
between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant
testimony with respect to criminal conduct. The balance of these vital
constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords with the
tried and traditional way of adjudicating such questions.

10 See, e.g., Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 711-12 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (allowing qualified
privilege available under some circumstances in civil litigation, since Branzburg does not control
in civil cases); United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 76-77 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
816 (1983) (allowing reporters qualified privilege in criminal, as well as civil cases, conditioned
upon a clear and specific showing that the information sought (1) is highly material and relevant,
(2) is necessary or critical to the claim, and (3) is not obtainable from other available sources);
United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 146-47 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1056
(1981) (holding that journalists have a federal common law qualified privilege, in both civil and
criminal cases, to refuse to divulge their sources); LaRouche v. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., 780 F.2d
1134, 1139 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 818 (1986) (holding that whether journalist’s
privilege will protect source depends upon whether the information sought is relevant, can be
obtained by alternate means, and is the subject of a compelling interest); Miller v. Transam.
Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 725 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981) (holding that a
reporter has first amendment privilege which protects refusal to disclose identity of confidential
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And then the tide began to turn. A number of lower courts began
to second guess the notion that the Powell opinion supplied a sound
basis for recognizing a federal privilege,11 fueled in part by ambivalent
signals from the Supreme Court itself.12 Several recent decisions,13
informants, although privilege is not absolute).
11 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Storer Commc’ns, Inc. v. Giovan, 810 F.2d 580, 585
(6th Cir. 1987) (“Accordingly, we decline to join some other circuit courts, to the extent that they
have stated their contrary belief that those predicates do exist, and have thereupon adopted the
qualified privilege balancing process urged by the three Branzburg dissenters and rejected by the
majority. . . . That portion of Justice Powell’s opinion certainly does not warrant the rewriting of
the majority opinion to grant a first amendment testimonial privilege to news reporters, especially
when the quoted language is considered in the context of that language which precedes it.”).
Among courts that do recognize a reporter=s privilege, there is a debate over whether it applies
only to confidential material gathered by journalists, or to non-confidential material as well, such
as videotape outtakes from television interviews. Several circuits have extended the privilege to
non-confidential work product, either in civil or criminal cases. See Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289,
1294-95 (9th Cir. 1993). Other courts, however, have refused to extend the privilege to nonconfidential material. See Gonzalez v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 155 F.3d 618 (2d Cir. 1998) (rejecting
privilege as to non-confidential material); United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1998)
(refusing to apply privilege to nonconfidential videotape outtakes sought in a criminal
proceeding); In re Shain, 978 F.2d 850, 853 (4th Cir. 1992) (tacitly rejecting the privilege in a
criminal case where the information sought was non-confidential).
12 Subsequent statements by the Supreme Court and individual Justices have advanced the
ambiguity. In University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 201 (1990), for example, the
Supreme Court stated: “In Branzburg, the Court rejected the notion that under the First
Amendment a reporter could not be required to appear or to testify as to information obtained in
confidence without a special showing that the reporter’s testimony was necessary.” And in N.Y.
Times Co. v. Jascalevich, 439 U.S. 1301, 1302 (1978), Justice White, writing an in-chambers
single-Justice opinion denying a stay, stated: “There is no present authority in this Court that a
newsman need not produce documents material to the prosecution or defense of a criminal case,
or that the obligation to obey an otherwise valid subpoena served on a newsman is conditioned
upon the showing of special circumstances.”
13 See McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 531-32 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.):
The defendants claim that the tapes in question are protected from compelled
disclosure by a federal common law reporter’s privilege rooted in the First
Amendment. See Fed. R. 501. Although the Supreme Court in Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972), declined to
recognize such a privilege, Justice Powell, whose vote was essential to the 5-4
decision rejecting the claim of privilege, stated in a concurring opinion that
such a claim should be decided on a case-by-case basis by balancing the
freedom of the press against the obligation to assist in criminal proceedings.
Id. at 709-10, 92 S.Ct. 2646. Since the dissenting Justices would have gone
further than Justice Powell in recognition of the reporter’s privilege, and
preferred his position to that of the majority opinion (for they said that his
‘enigmatic concurring opinion gives some hope of a more flexible view in the
future,’ id. at 725, 92 S.Ct. 2646), maybe his opinion should be taken to state
the view of the majority of the Justices-though this is uncertain, because
Justice Powell purported to join Justice White’s “majority” opinion. A large
number of cases conclude, rather surprisingly in light of Branzburg, that there
is a reporter’s privilege, though they do not agree on its scope. See, e.g., In re
Madden, 151 F.3d 125, 128-29 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. Smith, 135
F.3d 963, 971 (5th Cir. 1998) Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1292-93 (9th
Cir.1993); In re Shain, 978 F.2d 850, 852 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v.
LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1181-82 (1st Cir.1988); von Bulow v.
von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 142 (2d Cir.1987); United States v. Caporale, 806
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including the highly visible decision by the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in the Judith Miller litigation, have
cast serious doubt on the existence of a First Amendment privilege.
Until the United States Supreme Court squarely addresses the issue and
revisits Branzburg, First Amendment law will continue to be plagued by
uncertainty.
In In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller,14 the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in 2005,
interpreted Branzburg as squarely holding that no First Amendment
privilege existed, period. When the United States Supreme Court
refused to accept review, despite the urging of many amici and the able
representation of prominent constitutional litigators, the significance of
the Court of Appeals ruling was further magnified. That the Supreme
Court would let rest a decision of the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals rejecting the privilege in a case of such prominence and
visibility seemed to send a signal of agreement with the Judith Miller
ruling, and the possible demise in the long run of lower court precedent
that had endorsed the existence of a qualified reporter’s privilege
grounded in the First Amendment. In the aftermath of Branzburg,
journalists who continued to successfully assert the existence of a First
Amendment reporter’s privilege may have been living on borrowed
time. That time may now have run out.
F.2d 1487, 1504 (11th Cir. 1986). A few cases refuse to recognize the
privilege, at least in cases, which Branzburg was but this case is not, that
involve grand jury inquiries. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F.3d 397, 40203 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580, 584-86 (6th
Cir. 1987). Our court has not taken sides. Some of the cases that recognize the
privilege, such as Madden, essentially ignore Branzburg, see 151 F.3d at 128;
some treat the ‘majority’ opinion in Branzburg as actually just a plurality
opinion, such as Smith, see 135 F.3d at 968-69; some audaciously declare that
Branzburg actually created a reporter’s privilege, such as Shoen, 5 F.3d at
1292, and von Bulow v. von Bulow, supra, 811 F.2d at 142; see also cases cited
in Schoen at 1292 n.5, and Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 467-68 (9th Cir.
1975). The approaches that these decisions take to the issue of privilege can
certainly be questioned. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, supra, 810 F.2d at
584-86. A more important point, however, is that the Constitution is not the
only source of evidentiary privileges, as the Supreme Court noted in
Branzburg with reference to the reporter’s privilege itself. 408 U.S. at 689,
706, 92 S.Ct. 2646. And while the cases we have cited do not cite other
possible sources of the privilege besides the First Amendment and one of
them, LaRouche, actually denies, though without explaining why, that there
might be a federal common law privilege for journalists that was not based on
the First Amendment, see 841 F.2d at 1178 n.4; see also In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, supra, 5 F.3d at 402-03, other cases do cut the reporter’s
privilege free from the First Amendment. See United States v. Cuthbertson,
630 F.2d 139, 146 n.1 (3rd Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, supra,
810 F.2d at 586-88; cf. Gonzales v. National Broadcasting Co., 194 F.3d 29,
36 n.2 (2d Cir. 1999).
Id. (citations as in original).
14 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1150 (2005).
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CONCLUSION: A BLUEPRINT FOR A FEDERAL PRIVILEGE
To extend a newsgathering privilege to our federal court system is
not a radical proposition. The fact that some 49 states and the District
of Columbia have extended some form of newsgathering privilege to
citizens is a “national referendum” attesting to this country’s sense of
the critical role that a vibrant press plays in a free society. Federal
legislation would simply put the federal court system, and most
importantly, the federal government itself, within the rubric of the same
balance that has been struck by most states. The experience of the
states and the District of Columbia have served as a valuable proving
ground for the value of a reporter’s privilege, and the possibility of
crafting such a privilege in a nuanced manner that balances the
competing societal interests.
This essay is not the appropriate vehicle for an exhaustive
taxonomy of the many variants among state rules, but a nutshell
summary of the principles that ought to inform the creation of a federal
shield law, and the principles that ought to guide the federal judiciary in
its interpretation of such a shield law, may be distilled from the
substantial body of state and federal decisions that have either applied
state shield or common-law doctrines, or crafted a conditional privilege
grounded in the First Amendment or federal common law. Here are
some suggestions:
The privilege should be qualified, not absolute, and should borrow
from the rich body of case law and statutory experience with the
statutory and common-law balancing tests that have been employed by
many state and federal courts.
The privilege should not be confined to “mainstream,”
“professional” journalists, but should extend more broadly to others
(such as internet bloggers) who gather information from confidential
sources for the purpose of disseminating news or commentary on issues
of public concern to the general public. A federal shield law should
thus include language that would encompass those who engage in the
“functional equivalent” of traditional journalism, even though we would
not consider them part of the mainstream or traditional press.
In applying the qualified privilege in defamation cases in which the
defendant journalist refuses to divulge the identity of a confidential
source allegedly relied on in producing the story giving rise to the
defamation claim, courts should not permit the journalist interposing the
privilege to rely on the unidentified confidential source to support the
journalist’s claim that he or she published without actual malice or
negligence.15
15 The invocation of a shield law, for example, should normally be sufficient in and of itself
to defeat a defense motion for summary judgment on the actual malice issue. In Collins v. Troy
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The legislation should contain an explicit provision that extends
the privilege after the death of a journalist, following the model in
Swidler & Berlin v. United States.16
There should be no per se “carve out” for national security matters.
We live at a time in American history in which the watchdog role of a
free and aggressive press is more vital than ever, and that watchdog role
must above all include the vital and historic role of the press as a check
and balance on the actions of the national government in matters
relating to national security and foreign affairs. The delicate balance
between the compelling interest in protecting our national security and
the preservations of civil liberty that rests at the very heart of the
American identity and our constitutional system is best preserved by
granting to citizens qualified protection for promises of confidentiality
extended in the process of newsgathering. Debate over how to strike
this balance is one of the profound issues of our times.
A
newsgathering privilege ensures that this debate will be a “fair contest”
between the role of the press as a watchdog ferreting out wrongdoing
and abuses, and the right and duty of the government to protect truly
important national security secretes. We should thus not carve out a
blanket exception for all national security matters, but instead include
national security within the general balancing test. In most instances
national security interests would trump the invocation of the privilege,
but we should preserve the possibility that the invocation of the national
security interest would be overridden by courts when it is a sham.

Publ’g Co., 623 N.Y.S.2d 663 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995), for example, the court held that on
defendant’s motion for summary judgment, a triable issue of fact existed regarding whether an
article was published with actual malice when the defendant newspaper did not have any support
for its allegations other than confidential sources. The defendant was precluded from relying on
these sources at trial to prove lack of actual malice if it kept them confidential under the state
shield law. If the defendant was allowed to rely on its confidential sources to prove it acted
without actual malice, the court reasoned it would deprive the plaintiff access to important
evidence that would make up a critical part of the cause of action. Id. at 881 (citing Greenberg v.
CBS, Inc., 419 N.Y.S.2d 988, 996-97 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1979)); see also Oak Beach Inn Corp.
v. Babylon Beacon, 464 N.E. 967, 971 (N.Y. 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 1158 (1985). The
logic here is simple fair play. The journalist should be prevented “from using as a sword the
information which they are shielding from disclosure.” Sands v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 560
N.Y.S.2d 416 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
16 524 U.S. 399 (1998) (holding that the attorney-client privilege survives death of the client).

